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Intensive discussion is now underway on the tax reform concept put for-
ward by Paul Kirchhof. Analyses based on extrapolations of individual tax
return data from the income tax statistics show that ending the main tax
concessions and allowances would not be enough to compensate for the loss
of revenue from lowering the top rate of tax to 25%. Moreover, the impor-
tance of simplifying the tax system is being exaggerated in public discus-
sion. A much simpler tax system is neither necessarily efficient nor fair. Pol-
iticians must look for reasonable compromises here.
With the appointment of Paul Kirchhof, Professor of Tax Law and
former Judge at the Constitutional Court, to the Union parties' competence
team the discussion on fundamental reform and simplification of the Ger-
man income and corporate tax system has intensified. Kirchhof has put for-
ward the most far-reaching proposal for tax reform of recent years in a con-
cept developed with his research group on the Federal tax code.1 He wants
to see an almost flat rate income tax of 25% on all taxable income over
euro 18 000; in return, all tax concessions and exemptions related to specific
types of income would be dropped, while lump sums would be allowed for
some income-related expenses and operating expenditure. The tax regula-
tions would also be tightened and their application simplified by thoroughly
systematizing and redrafting the income tax laws. 
DIW Berlin carried out a study of this and other proposed reforms in
April 2004 in regard to the revenue they would yield and their distribution
effects, as well as their effects on the supply of labour.2 The main conclusion
was that a clear drop in the rates of tax, particularly in the upper incomes
range, would cause considerable loss of revenue, and that this could not be
made good by broadening the tax base or stimulating growth. The propos-
1  Cf. www.bundessteuergesetzbuch.de/.
2  Stefan Bach, Peter Haan, Hans-Joachim Rudolph and Viktor Steiner: 'Reformkonzepte zur
Einkommens- und Ertragsbesteuerung: Erhebliche Aufkommens- und Verteilungswirkungen,
aber relativ geringe Effekte auf das Arbeitsangebot', in: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin, no. 16/
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als by Paul Kirchhof, as well as the concept put forward
by the Free Democrats,3 would mean that tax payers on
high incomes would pay very much less tax, not only in
absolute terms but also in relation to their incomes, than
tax payers on average earnings, so these proposals
would also lead to greater inequality of income.
In view of the current discussion on the scope for
broadening the tax base a consideration of the main con-
cessions and allowances is of interest. These are shown
in the tax statistics or can be estimated from (table). An
extensive and representative random sample was taken
from the income tax statistics for 1998 _ the latest year
for which data is as yet available _ and the key features
that are relevant for taxation policy were extrapolated to
the year 2005.4 According to the forecast 29 million tax
payers will be liable for income tax in 2005, of whom
3  Hermann Otto Solms (ed.): 'Niedrig _ einfach _ gerecht: Die neue
Einkommenssteuer' (www.hermann-otto-solms.de/sitefiles/reden/372/
1066741545.pdf); cf. FDP-Fraktion: 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Ein-
führung einer neuen Einkommenssteuer und zur Abschaffung der
Gewerbesteuer', Bundesdrucksache 15/2349 (http://dip.bundestag.de/
btd/15/023/1502349.pdf).
Table
Distribution of Income Tax Liability, Effective Tax Burden and Share of Tax Concessions and 




























































As % of taxable income7
1st to 3rd decile 21 8 1.5 3.7 5.2 5.7 4.7 2.2 2.7 20.5 2.5
4th decile 27 24 2.8 6.8 0.8 2.1 4.1 1.6 2.0 10.5 1.7
5th decile 31 29 4.2 8.6 0.7 1.8 3.5 1.7 1.8 9.5 1.1
6th decile 37 34 5.7 9.9 0.9 1.6 3.4 1.8 1.7 9.2 1.0
7th decile 44 40 7.6 11.2 0.8 1.6 3.3 1.8 1.7 9.2 1.2
8th decile 54 49 10.8 13.1 1.4 1.6 3.1 1.8 1.2 9.1 1.2
9th decile 73 62 16.1 15.3 1.8 1.5 2.8 1.9 1.1 9.2 1.4
10th decile . 135 51.3 23.0 5.8 4.1 1.6 2.3 0.6 14.5 5.1
Total . 40 100.0 15.0 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.2 11.8 2.7
Top 1% . 442 20.6 28.9 9.5 8.3 0.3 2.4 0.3 20.9 9.1
Top 0.1% . 1741 8.3 30.1 8.0 12.3 0.1 2.3 0.2 22.9 10.8
1 Taxable and non-taxable income, as far as shown in the income tax statistics, without capital gains, before deduction of high losses on renting and leasing and commercial
shareholdings, and adjusted for declared tax concessions, without income from social assistance and housing benefit. — 2 Married couples taxed jointly are treated as one tax
payer, the total is 29 million tax payers in 2005; with their children entitled to child allowances they account for 71% of the population. — 3 Losses of at least euro 5000 on real
estate directly owned, of at least euro 2500 on shareholdings (closed property funds, property developer partnerships etc.), and at least euro 2500 on commercial partner-
ships, with positive income of other types. — 4 Saver's free allowance and half-income procedure on dividend income. — 5 Tax-free bonuses for Sunday and public holiday
work and night shifts; estimate based on the DIW Berlin German Socio-Economic Panel; higher allowable expenses above the general employee's allowance. — 6 Without cap-
ital gains. — 7 Taxable income (after deduction of special expenses and extraordinary charges) before deduction of the child allowance for those eligible for family benefits.
Source: Calculations using the DIW Berlin income tax simulation model based on extrapolated data from the 1998 income tax statistics (Scientific Use File FAST from the Fed-
eral Statistical Office).
4  The FAST data base was used. This is based on a stratified random
sample of 10% of tax payers (just under 3 million cases) in the full
1998 income tax statistics and made available to research institutes as
a scientific use file. For reasons of data protection and tax confidential-
ity some of the information on a few tax payers with very high posi-
tive or negative incomes has been erased or randomized, entailing
estimates or imputations on these cases referring on marginal totals
from the published results. On the editing and extrapolation of the
data and the construction of the DIW income tax micro-simulation
model see also Stefan Bach et al.: 'Aufkommens- und Belastung-
swirkungen der Lohn- und Einkommenssteuer 2003 bis 2005'. Materi-
alien des DIW Berlin, no. 38 (www.diw.de/deutsch/produkte/publika
tionen/materialien/docs/papers/diw._rn04-04-38 pdf).DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 32/2005  359
14.8 million will be single and 14.2 million married cou-
ples taxed on their joint incomes.5 Simulation calcula-
tions of the income tax charged for the 2005 tax year
using DIW Berlin's income tax micro-simulation model
are in line with the current tax revenue and current esti-
mates of tax. Revenue from income tax charged will be
euro 171.4 billions, and revenue from non-assessed non-
assessed wage tax euro 15.1 billions.
Income tax as charged is progressive
In quantiles of effective gross income from economic
activity6 there is a considerable concentration of income
tax payable in the upper range of the income pyramid
(table).7 The ten percent of tax payers in the highest
income groups account for more than 51% of tax reve-
nue; the 1% wealthiest a good 20%, and the 0.1% right
at the top _ 29 000 tax payers _ provide 8.3% of revenue.
There is a clear progression in relation to gross income,
that is, the tax paid rises as income rises. In contrast to
claims made in many debates the 'rich' pay large
amounts of income tax, and they make a big contribu-
tion to financing public expenditure.
However, the effective average tax paid is clearly
lower, in relation to gross income, than the top tax rate
of 42%, even for tax payers on very high incomes. That
is interesting, as it is often postulated in German tax pol-
icy discussions that the total burden on income through
direct taxes should remain close to 'equal private and
public shares', that is, taxation should not exceed 50%
of total gross income. That is the famous 'half-and-half
principle' established by the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court.8 However, the rate of tax charged depends
on the taxable income, that is, income after deduction of
all income-related expenses, and personal allowances
(special expenses, in particular insurance contributions,
extraordinary charges, child allowances). As well as
these items, the basic free allowance and the progressive
tax schedule in the lower and middle ranges, other
amounts are deducted when calculating income, and
these also have to be taken into account, as do tax con-
cessions. There is also tax-free income (part of which
falls under the exemption with progression rule) and
reduced tax rates on capital gains.
Limited scope for 
broadening the tax base
Potential tax concessions or scope for broadening the
tax base can be identified using the extrapolated model
data base for 2005 (table). The relevant figures were
related to income in the meaning of § 2, Para. 4 of the
Income Tax Law, i.e. taxable income after deduction of
special expenses and extraordinary charges, and before
deduction of the child allowance within the framework
of eligibility for family benefits. The income tax scale is
then applied to this.
Many tax payers, particularly those in the upper ten
percent, declare losses on renting and leasing or com-
mercial shareholdings, and this is an indication of tax-
saving activities.9 However, even in the top income
groups these losses amount to less than 10% of the con-
siderable taxable income of these households. The
saver's free allowance and the half-income procedure on
dividends are taken into account in calculating tax-free
income from capital assets _ the latter, however, bal-
ances the advance payment on the final corporation tax
payable.
Bonuses paid for sunday, public holiday and night
shift work have not so far been taxed, and taxing them
is being discussed by all sides. They are not included in
the data in the income tax statistics, so appropriate
information from DIW Berlin's German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (GSOEP) was integrated in the tax data
set.10 In addition, higher allowable expenses above the
general employees' allowance were taken into account in
income from employment. This is mainly the com-
muter's allowance, which Paul Kirchhof and the FDP
propose dropping. The table also includes special
5  With children entitled to child allowances this is about 71% of the
population.
6  Including non-taxable income as far as this is shown in the income
tax statistics, without capital gains, before deduction of high losses on
renting and leasing and commercial shareholdings, and adjusted for
tax concessions declared (Annex ST), without income from social
assistance and housing benefit.
7  Statistical information is not available on the distribution of non-
assessed wage tax.
8  BVerfGB 93, 121 and 165.
9  In the forecast it is assumed that the losses on renting and leasing
will fall clearly from 1999 (starting from the 1998 level), and will stabi-
lize from 2002 at 65% of the 1998 level. This is confirmed by the first
results of the new current statistics on income tax published by the
Federal Statistical Office, which include most of the results of the
assessments for 2001. Cf. Volker Lietmeyer et al.: 'Jährliche Einkom-
menssteuerstatistik auf Basis der bisherigen Geschäftsstatistik der
Finanzverwaltung', in: Wirtschaft und Statistik, no. 7 /2005, p. 676.
This is also plausible in view of the ending of the investment promo-
tion in the new federal states, the excess supply on many regional
property markets and the introduction of a minimum tax payable from
1999. 
10  Using as base the R-Wave of GSOEP from 2001 the probability of
such income was estimated with a probit model and imputed to the
income tax data. However, there is no information on the amount of
these tax-free bonuses, so a global figure of 12% of hitherto taxable
gross income was assumed for these tax-free bonuses.360 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 32/2005
expenses (except insurance contributions)11 and extraor-
dinary charges;12 again Kirchhof wants to see most of
these dropped.
It is also difficult to estimate to what extent the pro-
posals on the calculation of profits will affect taxable
income. Kirchhof and the Union parties want to redraft
the tax balance sheet laws; Kirchhof in particular wants
to restrict the scope for building up hidden reserves
drastically, and probably fix lump sums for part of oper-
ating expenditure and the calculation of income.13 There
is no information on these relations in the tax statistics,
as profits are only shown on balance, that is, after
deduction of all operating expenditure. The Red-Green
Coalition Government (SPD and Green Party) has
already introduced a number of measures in this area in
recent years, from more stringent regulations on profit
determination through the introduction of a minimum
tax payable to more stringent documentation require-
ments for transfer pricing with related firms abroad.
Moreover, many of these measures involve higher tax
payments in the short term with lower tax payments
later (depreciation regulations, provisions), and to that
extent the effect on the actual tax liability and on tax
revenue is rather low in cash terms. In addition, reac-
tions by tax payers to the new rules would have to be
taken into account, with the corresponding effects on
location conditions. There is hardly any empirical evi-
dence on this.
Lacking more detailed information DIW Berlin made
general assumptions on the increase in profits in its
study. It was assumed for Kirchhof's concept that tax-
able profits (without capital gains) would rise perma-
nently by 15%. The effects of this assumption on tax-
able income are shown as a memo item in the table.
Altogether, the result for the regulations included
here shows a potential for broadening the tax base of
just under 12%. If more taxable profits are included the
figure would be 14.5%. This would finance correspond-
ing reductions in the rates of tax. But this potential vol-
ume would not be enough to cover the loss of tax reve-
nue from the high earners in the upper income groups, if
the top rate of tax were reduced to 25%. There would be
considerable loss of tax revenue, and, as DIW Berlin has
calculated for Paul Kirchhof's proposal, the distribution
of net incomes would be more unequal.
Nor are greater 'self-financing effects' to be expected
from rising employment and stronger growth in the
medium term. The effects on the labour supply esti-
mated by DIW Berlin are noticeable, but they are slight
compared with the considerable loss of tax revenue.14
This is particular true in the case of the radical tax
reform concepts. Marked changes in taxation rules can
also have a rather negative effect on economic develop-
ment in the short to medium term, if they entail some
depreciation of investments yet promoted (e.g. real
estate) and other adjustment costs. That applies particu-
larly if business decisions are negatively affected when
lump sums are fixed for deductions and more stringent
conditions are imposed on the calculations of income.
Too much importance attached to 
simplifying the tax system 
Simplifying the tax system is not an end in itself. If that
were the only objective income tax could be abolished
altogether and other taxes increased. And then even the
'tax declaration on a postcard' (as promoted by some
radical reformers) would be superfluous. But VAT rates
would have to go up to 39%, or the revenue needed from
income tax could be shared out evenly among the entire
population, in the form of a lump-sum tax on individu-
als. Everyone, from babies to the very old, would have
to pay euro 190 a month. If the 18.6 million children eli-
gible for child allowances were exempt, the charge
would be euro 240 a month. Clearly that is not feasible.
Economists are primarily interested in the efficiency
of taxation and its effects on distribution.15 That should
also be the main concern of tax policy. Simplicity and
transparency cut the costs of running the tax system, for
both the tax authorities and tax payers, and insofar they
make the tax system more efficient. But they should be
balanced against the other objectives of taxation. There
are conflicting aims here that need to be recognized and
acknowledged.
Taxing incomes as the expression of 'ability to pay'
is regarded as the central aim of taxation. That has been
established by the Federal Constitutional Court, where
Paul Kirchhof played a major part as justice. Econo-
11  Donations and contributions, education costs, maintenance pay-
ments, church tax, tax accountants' fees, pensions, permanent charges
and school fees.
12  Persons can claim these for subsistence and education costs, for
handicaps and nursing care, for child care and for unusual hardships.
13  The depreciation regulations are to be made more stringent; espe-
cially declining balance depreciation on mobile assets is to be reduced
or abolished; furthermore the scope for building up hidden reserves is
to be limited and some reserves returned to income.
14  Cf. Stefan Bach et al., loc. cit., p. 199.
15  On the following see Franz W. Wagner: 'Steuervereinfachung _ mit
ökonomischem Sachverstand gegen populistische Versimpelung', in:
ifo Schnelldienst, 1/2004, pp. 5-9; ibid: 'Steuervereinfachung und Ent-
scheidungsneutralität  _ konkurrierende oder komplementäre Leit-
bilder für Steuerreformen?' In: Steuer und Wirtschaft, no. 2, 2005,
pp. 93-107; Christoph Spengel and Wolfgang Wiegard: 'Duale Einkom-
menssteuer: Die pragmatische Variante einer grundlegenden Steuer-
reform', in: Wirtschaftsdienst, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 71-76.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 32/2005  361
mists also want the tax system to be largely neutral for
decision-making, that is, decisions on investment,
financing and the legal form of an enterprise should not
be influenced and 'distorted' by the tax system. In that
case there can be no really simple income tax system,
because the calculation of incomes is complicated. Any
government that embarks on the taxation of the com-
plex worlds of business and individuals' lives will have
to make compromises.
The key to a simpler tax system is ultimately lower
and more even rates of tax, as the radical reformers have
rightly recognized. The idea of a 'dual income tax'
points in the same direction.16 If the local business tax
were to be abolished and the rate of income tax limited
to 25% many of the problems now encountered in busi-
ness taxation would disappear of their own accord and
tax avoidance arrangements would no longer be so
worthwhile. But the consequence would be the distribu-
tion effects outlined above. Moreover, as with the con-
siderable loss of tax revenue the effects of increasing
other taxes or lowering expenditure would need to be
taken into account.17
Furthermore, even with a flat rate of tax of 25% it
will still be worthwhile to shift earnings abroad to a
lower tax country or argue with the tax authorities over
special depreciation. An examination of tax practice en
masse shows that it is not so much the often criticized
tax concessions and special exemptions that most
occupy the accountants, the tax authorities and the
courts as the fundamental questions of calculating prof-
its and deducting allowable expenses. It is difficult to
separate operating expenditure and other income-related
costs from private living costs or to estimate the appro-
priate economic life of machinery and equipment.18 Set-
ting lump sums for type categories here could greatly
simplify the tax system, but they will not necessarily
create more efficiency and fairness. Either the lump
sums would have to be high amounts, in order to cover
as many cases as possible, then there would be big loss
of tax revenue, or only one lump sum would be fixed,
which is evidently Kirchhof's idea for many areas. But
that would be unfair to many tax payers, and it could
have economic consequences that are not desirable. If,
for example, the lump sums meant that small firms were
taxed less than larger firms, many entrepreneurs would
aim to stay small. If employees were no longer allowed
to deduct commuting costs or double household costs
they would be less willing to take a job further away
from home, and more inclined to accept a job in their
neighborhood, even if the pay were lower.
16  Cf. Christoph Spengel and Wolfgang Wiegard, loc. cit.
17  Ultimately there are no scientific criteria for a fair distribution of
incomes or taxation. But see the study of people's attitudes of how fair
the tax system is: Jürgen Schupp and Gert C. Wagner: 'Gerechtigkeit
der Einkommensbesteuerung aus Sicht der Bürger', in: Wochenbericht
des DIW Berlin, no. 29/2005, pp. 451-453
18  Cf. the older studies by Lutz Haegert: 'Eine empirische Widerlegung
der gängigen Thesen über die Ursachen für die Überlastung der
Finanzgerichte', in: Betriebs-Berater, 1991, pp. 36-47; and Wolfgang
Stegmaier: 'Ursachen für die Überlastung der Finanzgerichte und Vor-
schläge zu ihrer Beseitigung', Hochschulschriften zur Betriebswirt-
schaftslehre, vol. 105, Munich 1993.